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MUST OFFICERS BE PERFECT?: MISTAKES OF LAW
AND MISTAKES OF FACT DURING TRAFFIC STOPS
INTRODUCTION
Officer Pearce saw an improper turn signal.' Officer Hiland ob-
served an obstructed front windshield. 2 Sergeant Drown and Trooper
Cason noticed obscured license plates.3 Officer Nicolino stopped the
vehicle because both license plates were missing.4 The common
thread in each of these situations is that the officer made a mistake of
law. Each thought they saw a traffic violation when no violation actu-
ally occurred.
Experts estimate that there are roughly one hundred million traffic
stops each year.5 Once the police have initiated a stop, it is easy for
them to broaden their investigation, including a warrantless search of
the vehicle.6 While the threshold for justifying the initial stop is not
high, officers often still make mistakes when stopping drivers. These
mistakes can be born of either fact or law.7 Courts allow mistakes of
fact to be objectively reasonable. 8 Moreover, a majority of courts dis-
tinguish mistakes of law from mistakes of fact, only applying a reason-
ableness standard to the latter-these courts assert that an officer's
mistake of law can never be objectively reasonable. In these jurisdic-
tions, traffic stops and subsequent searches based on mistakes of law
1. United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 959 (7th Cir. 2006).
2. People v. Cole, 874 N.E.2d 81, 83 (11. App. Ct. 2007).
3. See United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1141 (10th Cit. 2004); Hinojosa v. State, 319
S.W.3d 258, 260 (Ark. 2009).
4. United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 769 (8th Cir. 2005).
5. Illya Lichtenberg, Police Discretion and Traffic Enforcement: A Government of Men?, 50
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 425, 429 (2003) ("Since there are roughly fifty to sixty million traffic filings
each year in state courts, and not all traffic stops result in the issuance of summons, it is reasona-
bly estimated that there are over one hundred million traffic stops each year." (footnotes
omitted)).
6. See id. at 430; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.1 (4th ed. 2004) ("There are a number of different bases upon which a
warrantless search of a vehicle may be upheld."); Keith S. Hampton, Stranded in the Wasteland
of Unregulated Roadway Police Powers: Can "Reasonable Officers" Ever Rescue Us?, 35 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 499, 506 (2004) ("Once validly stopped, the police have broad authority to continue
the detention and search the vehicle .... ").
7. United States v. Miguel, 368 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th. Cir 2004) (stating that officers committed
a mistake of fact when they failed to understand whether the vehicle was properly registered);
DeGasso, 369 F.3d at 1144 (stating that an officer's misinterpretation of the fog lamp statute was
a mistake of law).
8. See infra notes 26-44 and accompanying text.
1035
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
are illegal and evidence will be excluded in accordance with the exclu-
sionary rule. However, a minority of courts assert that mistakes of
law can be objectively reasonable. These courts state that an objec-
tively reasonable mistake of law does not void the justification of a
traffic stop. Consequently, any evidence uncovered as a result of the
stop and search will not be excluded.
These differences in courts' approaches to mistakes of law result in
a number of inconsistencies. First, different courts in the same state
produce different results. In Iowa, for example, state courts have held
that traffic stops cannot be premised on mistakes of law, whereas the
Eighth Circuit has held the opposite.9 The opposite occurs in Missis-
sippi, where the Fifth Circuit has held that officers cannot make mis-
takes of law, whereas Mississippi state court allows mistakes of law.10
Second, many cases end up being decided purely on the narrow dis-
tinction of whether the officer's mistake was one of fact or one of
law."' Because mistakes of law and mistakes of fact are interdepen-
dent, the type of mistake made can be difficult to differentiate. 12 This
difficultly further contributes to conflicting outcomes. 13
This Comment argues that instead of a different standard, courts
should consider both mistakes of law and fact under the objectively
reasonable standard. Moreover, even if an officer makes an objec-
tively reasonable mistake of law, the exclusionary rule should not au-
tomatically apply. Part II of this Comment examines the relevant case
law behind allowing an officer to make mistakes of fact and mistakes
of law.14 It will discuss the reasoning for not allowing mistakes of
law by focusing on an Eleventh Circuit case, United States v.
9. Compare Smart, 393 F.3d at 770 ("[T]he distinction between a mistake of law and a mistake
of fact is irrelevant to the [F]ourth [A]mendment inquiry."), with State v. Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d
649, 652-54 (Iowa 2010) (declining to adopt the Eighth Circuit's approach to mistakes of law).
10. Compare United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that mistakes
of law do not provide probable cause for a stop), with Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1139
(Miss. 2001) ("[W]e find that the deputies had sufficient probable cause to stop Harrison, even in
light of the mistake of law.").
11. See United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005).
12. State v. Horton, 246 P.3d 673, 676 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010) ("The parties, in essence, disa-
gree whether the officer's mistake here was one of fact or law, and the line between the two is
not always easy to draw .... [T]he two types of mistakes [may be] 'inextricably connected'...."
(quoting State v. McCarthy, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999))).
13. Compare United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that
a misunderstanding concerning dealer plates was a mistake of law), with Horton, 246 P.3d at
676-77 (finding that the confusion regarding repossession plates was a mistake of fact). See also
Wayne A. Logan, Reasonableness as a Rule: A Paean to Justice O'Connor's Dissent in Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, 79 Miss. L.J. 115, 144 (2009) ("Even though the law-fact distinction is not
always clear-cut, police are forgiven reasonable mistakes of fact, on which probable cause is
based." (footnotes omitted)).
14. See infra notes 19-114 and accompanying text.
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Chanthasouxat.15 Part II then details the minority view by examining
federal law in the Eighth Circuit and state law in California. Part III
first argues that the reasoning for the majority view is uncompelling
and strict application of the exclusionary rule lacks merit. 16 Part III
then argues that allowing mistakes of law that are objectively reasona-
ble and not automatically applying the exclusionary rule adheres more
closely to Supreme Court precedent. 17 Part IV asserts that the distinc-
tion between mistakes of fact and law is not always clear, which often
creates uncertain outcomes.1 8 Lastly, Part IV argues that the public
policy reasons for allowing mistakes of fact apply equally to mistakes
of law. 19
II. BACKGROUND
This Part first examines the reasoning behind allowing officers to
make mistakes of fact. It then illustrates why the majority of courts
do not permit an officer's mistakes of law, using United States v.
Chanthasouxat to detail the principles that justify this position. This
Part concludes by reviewing the minority reasoning, primarily devel-
oped in the Eighth Circuit, as to why officers should be allowed to
make reasonable mistakes of law and how courts apply this doctrine.
While officers are afforded deference when determining probable
cause, their judgment is still subject to judicial review. 20 In Whren v.
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that a stop is "reason-
able where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred. '21 But most courts agree that the lesser stan-
dard of reasonable suspicion set forth in Terry v. Ohio22 is also per-
missible.23 Under Terry, a court should not look at the subjective
motivations of the officer; instead, it should use an objectively reason-
able standard to evaluate the stop.24 If the officer did not act reasona-
15. United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
16. See infra notes 115-45 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 146-70 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 171-95 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
21. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
22. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
23. Wayne R. LaFave, The "Routine Traffic Stop" from Start to Finish: Too Much "Routine,"
Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1848 (2004) ("Most courts have as-
sumed . .. that traffic stops as a class are permissible without probable cause if there exists
reasonable suspicion, that is, merely equivocal evidence.").
24. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) ("The principal components of a deter-
mination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events which occurred leading up
to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the stand-
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bly, the court can use the exclusionary rule to prevent the admission
of evidence. 25
A. Mistakes of Fact Are Objectively Reasonable
While on patrol, officers encounter a multitude of situations that
are ambiguous and require split-second decision making.26 In Brine-
gar v. United States, the Supreme Court stated, "Because many situa-
tions which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are
more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes [on
their part]. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men."'27
The key to mistakes of fact is determining whether the officer's ac-
tions were reasonable-if the officer acted in an objectively reasona-
ble manner, the evidence is admissible. 28
The Supreme Court further explained this standard in Illinois v.
Rodriguez.29 In Rodriguez, the officers seized drugs after entering the
point of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable
cause.").
25. THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
§ 13.1 (2008) ("The chief enforcement mechanism to insure compliance with the Fourth Amend-
ment is the exclusionary rule, which prohibits the introduction of illegally obtained evidence in
the government's case-in-chief.").
26. See Marc McAllister, What the High Court Giveth the Lower Courts Taketh Away: How to
Prevent Undue Scrutiny of Police Officer Motivations Without Eroding Randolph's Heightened
Fourth Amendment Protections, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 663, 699 (2008) ("Because police often
confront ambiguous situations when executing their duties, courts must allow room for honest
mistakes."); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 489 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) ("[T]he court has also recog-
nized the need to allow some latitude for honest mistakes that are made by officers in the dan-
gerous and difficult process of making arrests and executing search warrants.").
27. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
28. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96,
101 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Stops premised on mistakes of fact, however, generally have been held
constitutional so long as the mistake is objectively reasonable."); United States v. Jenkins, 452
F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The constitutional validity of a stop is not undermined simply
because the officers who made the stop were mistaken about relevant facts."); United States v.
Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) ("We have consistently held that an officer's mis-
take of fact, as distinguished from a mistake of law, may support probable cause or reasonable
suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop."); United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 366 F.3d 961, 962
(8th Cir. 2004) ("[A] mistake of fact does not automatically negate the validity of the stop. [The
officer] was justified in making the stop if he had an objectively reasonable basis for believing
that the vehicle was not in conformity with Nebraska's traffic laws."); United States v. Mariscal
285 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A] mere mistake of fact will not render a stop illegal, if the
objective facts known to the officer gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was
afoot."); United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment requires only a reasonable assessment of the facts, not a perfectly accurate one."); People
v. Cole, 874 N.E.2d 81, 88 (II1. App. Ct. 2007) ("[T]raffic stops based on an officer's objectively
reasonable mistake of fact rarely violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment."); State v. Louwrens, 792
N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 2010) ("[A]n officer's reasonable mistake of fact supporting his belief
that a traffic violation ... is underway will suffice as probable cause for a stop.").
29. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-88.
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defendant's residence with the consent of the defendant's girlfriend.30
However, the officers acted under the mistaken belief that the girl-
friend had the authority to grant access when, in fact, she did not.31
The Court held that although the officers entered under a mistaken
belief, the evidence was still admissible. 32 It reasoned that the basis
for the search does not need to be factually correct; instead, the of-
ficers only needed a reasonable belief that the girlfriend had authority
to grant access. 33
Though Rodriguez stands for the concept that officers can make
reasonable mistakes of fact without triggering the exclusionary rule,
the decision was not made in the context of a traffic stop.34 The Sev-
enth Circuit case United States v. Cashman demonstrates the reason-
ing for extending officer mistakes of fact to traffic stops. 35 In
Cashman, the officer stopped an automobile after observing what he
believed to be an "excessive" crack in the windshield. 36 During the
stop, the officer received consent to search the vehicle and discovered
methamphetamines and a notebook containing notes of drug deals.37
The defendant argued that the officer lacked probable cause to stop
the vehicle because the crack was not excessive. 38 But the Seventh
Circuit held that the stop was permissible because the excessiveness of
the crack was not at issue. 39 The court explained that the "pertinent
question instead is whether it was reasonable for [the officer] to be-
lieve that the windshield was cracked to an impermissible degree. '40
Because the officer "could readily and reasonably think that the crack
met the administrative criteria for excessive cracking," the fruits of the
search were not excluded. 41 In other words, as long as the officer's
30. Id. at 179.
31. Id. at 180.
32. Id. at 183-84.
33. Id. at 184 ("But 'reasonableness,' with respect to this necessary element, does not demand
that the government be factually correct in its assessment that that is what a search will pro-
duce."). "It is apparent that in order to satisfy the 'reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly
be made by agents of the government.., is not that they always be correct, but that they always
be reasonable." Id. at 185.
34. Id. at 179-80.
35. See United States v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2000).
36. Id. at 584.
37. Id. at 584-85.
38. Id. at 586-87.
39. Id. at 587.
40. Id.
41. Cashman, 216 F.3d at 587.
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mistake was objectively reasonable, the mistake of fact did not impact
the search. 42
In Illinois v. Gates, the Supreme Court summarized the reasonable
officer standard by stating that the "evidence thus collected must be
seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. ' 43 The
main thrust for allowing mistakes of fact is that the officer's lapse in
judgment was reasonable, and given the difficult situations officers
confront, courts must allow for mistakes. 44
B. A Mistake of Law: Split Between the Circuits
While the standard for mistakes of fact is clear, courts are split on
whether a mistake of law in the context of a traffic stop and seizure
can ever be reasonable. A majority of courts do not allow officers to
make a mistake of law when executing a traffic stop, while a minority
of courts hold the opposite as long as the mistake was reasonable.
This Part details both positions.
1. The Majority of Courts Do Not Allow for Mistakes of Law
The majority of courts assert that a mistake of law does not support
probable cause because it can never be objectively reasonable. 45 In
42. Id.
43. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983).
44. See McAllister, supra note 26, at 699; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87
(1987).
45. See Wayne A. Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 79 (2011) ("More re-
cently, police mistakes of law have been deemed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
While police are forgiven for their reasonable mistakes of fact, they are not forgiven for their
mistakes of substantive law-even if reasonable." (footnote omitted)); see also United States v.
Gross, 550 F.3d 578, 584 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[W]e note that the vast majority of our sister
circuits to decide this issue have concluded that an officer's mistake of law, even if made in good
faith, cannot provide grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause, because an officer's
mistake of law can never be objectively reasonable."); United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958,
962 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Even though [the officer] may have acted in good faith, there is no good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule when, as here, an officer makes a stop based on a mis-
take of law and the defendant is not violating the law."); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96,
101 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Stops premised on a mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake,
are generally held to be unconstitutional."); United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1144 (10th
Cir. 2004) ("An officer's reasonable mistake of fact, as distinguished from a mistake of law, may
support the probable cause or reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a traffic stop."); United
States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[A]n officer's reasonable mistake
of fact may provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause required to
justify a traffic stop, but an officer's mistake of law may not."); United States v. King, 244 F.3d
736, 741 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[A]n officer's mistake of law cannot form the basis for reasonable
suspicion to initiate a traffic stop .... ); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998)
("[G]iven that having a turn signal on is not a violation of Texas law, no objective basis for
probable cause justified the stop .... ); Gordon v. State, 901 So. 2d 399, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1040
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United States v. Chanthasouxat, the Eleventh Circuit summarized the
argument for excluding evidence obtained following an officer's mis-
take of law.46 In Chanthasouxat, the officer stopped the defendant for
not having a rearview mirror.47 The officer had previously written
tickets for the offense based on his police academy training and a
magistrate's interpretation of the regulation.48 However, the regula-
tion the officer cited did not actually apply to driving without a
rearview mirror.49 During the stop, the officer obtained consent to
search the vehicle and discovered cocaine.50
The search was suppressed on appeal because the stop was based on
a mistake of law. 51 The court conceded that the officer had acted rea-
sonably because of his training, previously issued tickets, and the mag-
istrate's previous interpretation. 52 But the court stated that "a
mistake of law cannot provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to justify a traffic stop. ''53 Therefore, the stop was illegal and the
court excluded the fruits of the search. 54
There are four justifications for rejecting mistakes of law and apply-
ing the exclusionary rule: (1) officers should know the law, therefore
not knowing the law is unreasonable;55 (2) the court should apply the
2005) ("[The] Deputies' misapprehension of the law did not establish the existence of probable
cause .... "); People v. Cole, 874 N.E.2d 81, 88 (I1. App. Ct. 2007) ("We agree with the majority
of federal courts of appeal that a traffic stop based on a mistake of law is generally unconstitu-
tional, even if the mistake is reasonable and made in good faith."); State v. Louwrens, 792
N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 2010) ("[Wle are ultimately persuaded that the approach acknowledging
a fundamental distinction between an officer's mistake of fact and mistake of law is better-rea-
soned."); People v. Smith, 767 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) ("A mistake of fact, but
not a mistake of law, may be used to justify a search and seizure." (citations omitted)).
46. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279-80.
47. Id. at 1272.
48. Id. at 1274.
49. Id.; BIRMINGHAM, ALA., CITY CODE, § 10-11-5 ("No person shall drive on any street of the
city a motor vehicle which is so constructed or loaded as to prevent the driver from obtaining a
view of the street to the rear by looking backward from the driver's position unless that vehicle is
equipped with a mirror so located as to reflect to the driver a view of the streets for a distance of
at least 200 feet of the rear of the vehicle.").
50. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1273.
51. See id. at 1279-80.
52. Id. at 1279.
53. Id.
54. ld. at 1280.
55. See Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REv. 687,
743 (2011) ("It is a hallmark of substantive criminal law that ignorance of the law is no defense.
The rationale most commonly advanced for this seemingly harsh result is that the refusal to
reward ignorance is necessary 'so that the proper standard of conduct will be learned and
respected by others."' (quoting Robert L. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake of Law Analogy, 77
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507, 509 (1986); see also Logan, supra note 45, at 91 ("Reciprocal
expectations of law-abidingness between government and citizens can scarcely be expected to
DEPA UL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1035
exclusionary rule so that officers will have an incentive to actually
learn the law;56 (3) allowing officers to make stops based on a mistake
of law will provide them with wide latitude to abuse their authority;57
and (4) allowing officers to make mistakes of law violates the separa-
tion of powers.58
The first of these justifications contends that as enforcers of the law,
it is unreasonable for officers to not know the law. 59 The Eleventh
Circuit stated that there is a "fundamental unfairness of holding citi-
zens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,'
while allowing those 'entrusted to enforce' the law to be ignorant of
it."60
The second justification argues that the exclusionary rule applies
because if courts allow mistakes of law, police will have no incentive
to learn the law.61 The exclusionary rule is "designed to deter police
misconduct. '62 By not allowing mistakes of law, the court provides
incentives to improve officer knowledge.63 Thus, the argument specu-
lates that allowing mistakes of law removes this incentive, which may
lead to illegal stops and searches. 64
The third justification is based on the fear that allowing mistakes of
law will promote pretextual stops. 65 Police have broad discretion to
stop vehicles,66 and allowing mistakes of law widens the latitude of
endure if one party-the government-need not uphold its end of the bargain." (footnotes
omitted)).
56. Marceau, supra note 55, at 744.
57. United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) ("But if officers are al-
lowed to stop vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws have been violated
even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic infractions
as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive.").
58. See Logan, supra note 45, at 95.
59. Marceau, supra note 55, at 743; see also United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138
(10th Cir. 2005) ("[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is
not objectively reasonable." (emphasis omitted)).
60. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1280 (citation omitted) (quoting Bryan v. United States, 524
U.S. 184, 196 (1998)).
61. Marceau, supra note 55, at 744; see also United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1106
(9th Cir. 2000).
62. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
63. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106 ("To create an exception here would defeat the purpose of
the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to make certain that they
properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce and obey.").
64. See Logan, supra note 13, at 144 n.198.
65. See United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Logan, supra
note 13, at 146 ("[Police] have the concomitant power to detain individuals for behavior never
even legislatively proscribed.").
66. See Hampton, supra note 6, at 504 ("[P]olice have a wide array of laws to justify automo-
bile stops based on admittedly ambiguous behavior.").
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police power, which increases the possibility of abuse.67 Not only will
officers be able to stop individuals based on actual traffic infractions,
they will be able to stop individuals even when they comply with the
law. 68 This new power would enable officers to abuse their authority
and invade a driver's right to privacy.69
Lastly, the majority view's final justification for exclusion is that al-
lowing officers to make mistakes of law is akin to allowing an officer
to interpret the law. 70 Permitting mistakes of law damages the separa-
tion between the executive and judicial branches 71 by removing the
judiciary's power to properly interpret and enforce the laws that check
executive powers.72
2. A Minority of Courts View Officer Mistakes of Law as Being
Objectively Reasonable
In a minority of courts, an officer's mistake of law can be objec-
tively reasonable.7 3 The minority view is best illustrated through cases
from the Eighth Circuit 74 and the California case of People v. Glick.75
67. See Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289.
68. Logan, supra note 13, at 146.
69. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d at 289.
70. See Logan, supra note 45, at 95 ("When courts forgive mistaken police constructions of
laws, a problem akin to that attending judicial approval of vague laws arises .... [A]llowing
police to make reasonable mistakes of law, as the Eleventh Circuit has observed, serves to
'sweep behavior into [a] statute which the authors of the statute may have had in mind but failed
to put into the plain language of the statute.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003))).
71. See Logan, supra note 45, at 96 ("The allowance, however, does more than augment exec-
utive power and undercut legislative primacy; it functions as an abdication of judicial
authority.").
72. Id. ("Courts find it 'unnecessary' to interpret statutory language or content themselves
with generalized assessments of whether an officer's interpretation was reasonable." (footnotes
omitted)).
73. United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[Defendant] argues that
even under the permissive reasonable suspicion standard, a mistake of law by the seizing officer
will render a traffic stop per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... [W]e do not
agree."); United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he distinction between a
mistake of law and a mistake of fact is irrelevant to the [F]ourth [A]mendment inquiry."); Hi-
nojosa v. State, 319 S.W.3d 258, 262-64 (Ark. 2009); Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 935 (Miss.
2008) ("[The officer] had sufficient probable cause to pull [defendant] over although, as it turns
out [the officer] based his belief of a traffic violation on a mistake of law."); State v. Barnard, 658
S.E.2d 643, 645 (N.C. 2008) ("It is irrelevant that part of [the officer's] motivation for stopping
defendant may have been a perceived, though apparently non-existent, statutory violation
.... ); see also Logan, supra note 45, at 79-82.
74. United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 411
F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005); Smart, 393 F.3d 767; United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.
1999).
75. People v. Glick, 250 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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a. United States v. Sanders and United States v. Smart
In Sanders, the officer stopped a vehicle towing a trailer in which
one of the two taillights was missing a red cover and emitting a white
light.7 6 During the stop, an assisting officer asked the defendant, who
was a passenger, to exit the vehicle. 77 When the defendant exited, the
officer found a package containing methamphetamine and marijuana
on the seat.78 South Dakota law, however, provided that trailers built
before 1973 only needed one working taillight,79 and the defendant
argued that because the trailer was manufactured pre-1973, the stop
was based on a mistake of law and the search was invalid.
The court held that "[r]egardless of whether or not the trailer actu-
ally was in violation of the South Dakota statute, [the officer] was
justified in making the stop.'' 80 The court reasoned that "[t]he deter-
mination of whether probable cause existed is not to be made with the
vision of hindsight, but instead by looking to what the officer reasona-
bly knew at the time."81 Because the officer "could have reasonably
believed" that "the trailer was subject to the two taillight require-
ment" the stop was justified.8 2 The court further noted that officers
should not be held to a standard in which they "have to interpret the
traffic laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense
attorney."83
The reasoning in Sanders was affirmed in United States v. Smart, in
which evidence recovered during a stop based on a mistake of law was
admitted.8 4 In Smart, the officer stopped a vehicle that did not have a
front license plate.8 5 In Iowa, vehicles were required to have both
plates, but the vehicle was registered in Georgia and complied with
the requisite Georgia statute, which only required one plate.8 6 At the
time of the stop, the officer could not tell whether the plate was an
Iowa or Georgia plate and was unfamiliar with Georgia law.8 7 After
stopping the vehicle, the car was searched and a handgun was found,
the possession of which was a violation of the driver's parole.88 The
76. Sanders, 196 F.3d at 912.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 912-13; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 32-17-8 (2002).




84. See United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770-71 (8th Cir. 2005).
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court allowed the search to stand even though the car had not violated
the law by having only one plate.89 The court stated that "the distinc-
tion between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact is irrelevant to the
[F]ourth [A]mendment inquiry." Instead, "the validity of a stop de-
pends on whether the officer's actions were objectively reasonable in
the circumstances, and in mistake cases the question is simply whether
the mistake, whether of law or of fact, was an objectively reasonable
one." 90 Here, it was permissible to stop the vehicle because the of-
ficer had an objectively reasonable belief that the missing license plate
violated Iowa law, and he was unfamiliar with Georgia law.91
b. United States v. Martin and United States v. Washington
Although both Sanders and Smart used the objectively reasonable
standard, neither case provided guidance on its application.92 In
United States v. Martin,93 and continuing in United States v. Washing-
ton, 94 the Eighth Circuit established guideposts for reviewing an of-
ficer's mistake of law. In Martin, tribal police stopped and searched a
vehicle on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation because one of the two
brake lights was out. 95 Tribal law, however, did not require that both
brake lights be operational because the statute used the term "stop
light," as opposed to "stop lights. '96 The court, after considering sev-
eral factors-the ambiguity of the statute, prior interpretations, previ-
ous judicial rulings and common usage in adjoining states-ultimately
determined that the officer acted reasonably and held that the search
was legal, though it was based on a mistake of law. 97
The Martin factors were then applied in United States v. Washing-
ton, in which an officer's stop was held unreasonable. 98 In Washing-
ton, the officer stopped a vehicle for a crack in the windshield that he
deemed obstructed the view of the driver.99 Because Nebraska law
contained no such provisions there was no violation. 00 Nonetheless,
during the stop the officer searched car and found a firearm, which
89. Id. at 770.
90. Smart, 393 F.3d at 770.
91. Id.
92. See id.; United States v. Sanders, 196 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999)
93. United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2005).
94. United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2006).
95. Martin, 411 F.3d at 1000.
96. Id. at 1000-01.
97. Id. at 1001.
98. Washington, 455 F.3d at 827.




violated the defendant's probation 01 The court excluded the gun,
stating that "the government has not presented any evidence of police
manuals or training materials, state case law, legislative history, or any
other state custom or practice that would create some objectively rea-
sonable basis for the traffic stop."'01 2 For an officer to act reasonably
there must be "a basis in state law for an officer's action and some
ambiguity or state custom that caused the officer to make the mis-
take. ' 103 Importantly, the court limited the standard by stating that
even though the officer's "own past practices were based on the same
mistake of law they did not justify future stops. ' 10 4
c. People v. Glick
Outside of the Eighth Circuit, the California case People v. Glick
adds an additional wrinkle for courts to consider when determining
whether an officer's mistake of law was reasonable. 10 5 In Glick, the
California officer stopped a vehicle because its New Jersey license
plate did not display a vehicle renewal sticker.10 6 Under California
law, the sticker was required to be on the plate itself, whereas in New
Jersey it was not. 0 7 During the stop, the officer determined that the
automobile had been stolen. 10 8 He then searched the car and seized
contraband. 10 9 The court reasoned that the "New Jersey Vehicle Code
is not something the officer is reasonably expected to know" in Cali-
fornia." 0 Though the officer made a mistake of law when he stopped
the vehicle, his mistake could have been reasonable because the law
was foreign."1 But the officer's actions may be unreasonable "if the
vehicle was from a contiguous sister state or if that state's motorists
routinely drive along" California's roads.'1 2 Further, the court rea-
soned that it must consider the officer's conduct in light of two com-
peting considerations: Fourth Amendment protections and
governmental interests.113
101. Id. at 826-27.
102. Id. at 828.
103. Id.
104. Washington, 455 F.3d at 828.
105. See People v. Glick, 250 Cal. Rptr. 315, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); see also Logan, supra
note 45, at 81-82.




110. Id. at 319.
111. Id. at 317-19.
112. Glick, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 319.
113. Id.
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Thus, the minority view does not differentiate between mistakes of
law and mistakes of fact. Instead, mistakes of law are allowed pro-
vided that the mistake is reasonable.1 14 This standard considers a
number of factors, including police training, previous rulings, ambigu-
ity in the law, legislative history, and state custom and practices to
review the officers' behavior. However, courts have made it clear that
previous mistakes by the officer do not make future stops based on
the same mistake objectively reasonable. In sum, if the court can de-
termine that the officer acted reasonably, the fruits of the search are
admissible.
III. ANALYSIS
This Comment argues that all courts should allow reasonable mis-
takes of law. Further, even if a mistake of law is not objectively rea-
sonable, the exclusionary rule should not automatically apply.
Because the exclusionary rule is an extreme remedy, its use should be
limited, consistent with the Supreme Court's guidance in Davis v.
United States. This Part first argues that the justifications for the ma-
jority view, which prohibits mistakes of law, lack merit. It then pro-
poses that the minority view more closely adheres to Supreme Court
precedent.
A. The Majority View's Reasoning Lacks Merit
The majority view makes four assertions for why mistakes of law
lead to the application of the exclusionary rule-none of these stands
up to scrutiny.
1. An Officer Should Know the Law
The first assertion argues that officers should know the law, and,
therefore, mistakes of law are not objectively reasonable. 115 This ar-
gument is weak given the complexity of laws across the states." 6
Even the Supreme Court expressed its concerns about an officer's
114. United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005): United States v. Sanders, 196
F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir. 1999).
115. United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003).
116. Professor Wayne Logan noted:
A prime justification for forgiving police mistakes of law lies in the enormous number
and often-technical nature of low-level offenses that commonly serve as bases to stop
and arrest individuals. The expectation that the law is "definite and knowable" is no
more tenable for police today than it is for the lay public. State, local, and federal
codes overflow with provisions-often of a malum prohibitum or regulatory nature-
prescribing what individuals must or must not do. For police, as noted at the outset, the
profusion has coalesced with decisional law, which, in broadening the gamut of positive
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ability to handle the complexities of the law in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista.117 In Atwater, the court stated that it "is not merely that we
cannot expect every police officer to know the details of frequently
complex penalty schemes... but that penalties for ostensibly identical
conduct can vary on account of facts difficult (if not impossible) to
know at the scene of an arrest." 118 And in Virginia v. Moore, the
Court reiterated its concern that state law can be vague and
complicated.119
Opponents argue that officers can learn the law through advances
in technology, especially dashboard computer systems.1 20 However,
this request is unrealistic, which can be illustrated with a simple vehi-
cle registration mistake regarding an out of state license plate. Oppo-
nents seem to want officers to recognize the violation, check the
license plate, look up the law in that state, interpret that law, and then
make the stop. But, given the split-second nature of law enforcement,
officers cannot be expected to take such measures. Moreover, the op-
ponents seem to want officers to not only know the out-of-state law,
but also to interpret it, which is outside the realm of even experienced
attorneys.
2. The Exclusionary Rule Encourages Officers to Learn the Law
The majority view argues that if courts exclude evidence due to an
officer's mistake, officers will be encouraged to learn the law to pre-
vent future exclusions. The problem with this line of reasoning is that
in many of the cases the officers made a reasonable effort to learn the
law, but simply misapplied it.121 In addition, when officers make a
law justifying seizures, has had the ancillary effect of increasing the substantive knowl-
edge demands imposed on police.
Logan, supra note 45, at 83.
117. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
118. Id. at 348
119. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) ("Incorporating state-law arrest limitations
into the Constitution would produce a constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable
than the one we rejected in Atwater. The constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply
as the underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed.").
120. See Logan, supra note 45, at 84. ("The volume-and-complexity argument, however, col-
lapses under its own weight .... Such a view, even if not rejected on democratic-governance
concerns alone, would appear especially unjustified given unprecedented improvements in the
educational backgrounds of police and ready access to substantive law, including via dashboard
computers." (footnotes omitted)).
121. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 959-60, 962 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating
that the officer consulted his "Offense Code Book"); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d
1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that both training and a magistrate had informed the officer
of the law); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the
officer's knowledge came from police academy training).
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reasonable attempt to learn and apply the law, excluding the evidence
interrupts important policing functions. Officers serve to protect soci-
ety and excluding evidence of crimes interrupts this function, which in
turn hinders the ability of officers to keep the public safe from violent
criminals. 122 Supreme Court precedent mandates that the exclusion-
ary rule should be used sparingly and must balance the rights of the
accused against society. 123 A blanket rule that excludes the fruits of a
search is an unnecessarily harsh burden on society when officers make
reasonable mistakes of law.
Furthermore, the majority view's approach of applying the exclu-
sionary rule is inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence. In
Herring v. United States, the Court indicated its unwillingness to apply
the exclusionary rule to officer errors when it reviewed whether a mis-
take in a police database could support a search and seizure. 124
Though Herring does not refer to mistakes of law, it demonstrates the
Court's restraint in applying the exclusionary rule, as well as the rule's
ability, or lack thereof, to curtail officer misbehavior. 2 5 Specifically,
the court stated that the "fact that a Fourth Amendment violation oc-
curred . . . does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule ap-
plies"; in fact, this view has been "repeatedly rejected. ' 126 Further,
the court reasoned that when applying the rule "deterrence must out-
weigh the costs" because of the "'rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking
and law enforcement objectives.'- 127 Thus, automatically applying the
exclusionary rule is incorrect and courts need to weigh deterrence ver-
sus the important policing functions officers perform.
122. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) ("And its bottom-line effect, in many
cases, is to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.
Our cases hold that society must swallow this bitter pill when necessary, but only as a 'last
resort.' For exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh
its heavy costs." (citations omitted)).
123. See Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Law: Is the Exclusionary Rule Dead?, 102 J. CRIM L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3-4 (2012) ("[T]he Court, per Justice Scalia, held that the exclusionary rule
should only apply in cases 'where its deterrent benefits outweigh it substantial costs.'" (quoting
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). "In a later case, the Court agreed that the
evidence found should not have been suppressed [and] reiterated Hudson's unfounded state-
ment that 'exclusion "has always been our last resort, not our first impulse .... Id. at 5 (quoting
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009)).
124. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137-40 (2009); see also Logan, supra note 45,
at 85.
125. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 143; see also Logan, supra note 45, at 86 ("While Herring did not
involve a mistake of law, its rationale aligns with judicial inclination to forgive police mistakes of
law. Early expression of the view is found in the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in United States
v. Williams, cited by the Leon majority." (footnotes omitted)).
126. Id. at 140-41.




Although a main point of support for the majority view is that it
encourages officers to learn the law, this argument flies in the face of
Supreme Court precedent.1 28 The Court stated that "the abuses that
gave rise to the exclusionary rule featured intentional conduct that
was patently unconstitutional. '129 According to the Court, "[t]o trig-
ger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliber-
ate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. '1 30
Further, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule "serves to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circum-
stances recurring or systematic negligence," 131 and concluded that
mere negligence by an officer does not justify invoking the exclusion-
ary rule.1 32
Lastly, there is concern as to whether the exclusionary rule is even
an effective deterrent and shaper of officer behavior.1 33 Professor
Thomas K. Clancy examined the empirical evidence and determined
that "there has been no convincing studies on the matter. ' 134 Though
the majority of lower courts look to use the exclusionary rule to deter
officer behavior, there are doubts about the exclusionary rule's ef-
fect.1 35 Therefore, a primary justification for the majority view is un-
dermined by the empirical evidence on the issue.
In sum, the majority view's use of the exclusionary rule does not
adhere to Supreme Court precedent. The rule excludes evidence
without weighing it against the officers' actions, which has great con-
sequences to the justice system. Given that the exclusionary rule itself
may not be an effective deterrent, the minority rule more accurately
reflects Supreme Court guidance by weighing the circumstances sur-
rounding the stop and determining whether the officer's conduct re-
quires the application of the exclusionary rule.
128. Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEo. L.J.
1077, 1087 (2011) ("In every Supreme Court good faith case, the Supreme Court has found the
claim of nonpolice deterrence unpersuasive and ruled in favor of the government .
129. Herring, 555 U.S. at 143.
130. Id. at 144.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 147-48.
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3. Allowing Mistakes of Law Will Create Abuse
The third argument made by the majority view is that allowing mis-
takes of law provides an opportunity for abuse.' 36 The minority view,
however, prevents abuse as effectively as the majority view. If an of-
ficer makes a stop based on a mistake of law, the onus is on the officer
to demonstrate that the mistake was reasonable.137 During this pro-
cess, the court will have a number of opportunities to determine
whether the officer acted reasonably. 138 If the officer fails to make an
appropriate demonstration, the court can rule that the mistake was
not reasonable and exclude the evidence. 139 This additional inquiry
will not burden the court; the court is familiar with reviewing police
activity under the mistake of fact construct and can easily extend that
to mistake of law. Analyzing mistakes of law under the familiar rea-
sonableness standard used for mistakes of fact would actually reduce
the threat of pretextual stops because courts can exclude evidence
based on an unreasonable mistake of law.
4. Allowing Mistakes of Law Undermines the Separation of Powers
The majority view's fourth concern is that allowing mistakes of
law will reduce judicial authority and undermine the separation of
powers.140 It is the legislature's responsibility to write laws and courts'
responsibility to interpret them. 41 By providing officers in the execu-
tive branch the opportunity to expand laws by changing their interpre-
tation, the roles of both the legislature and the executive are
supposedly infringed.' 42 However, courts that allow mistakes of law
have not abdicated this power and continue to review the officer's
actions for reasonableness. 143 The Eighth Circuit has not offered a
blank check to officers; in fact, in United States v. Washington, the
136. United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999) ("But if officers are
allowed to stop vehicles based upon their subjective belief that traffic laws have been violated
even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred, the potential for abuse of traffic infractions
as pretext for effecting stops seems boundless and the costs to privacy rights excessive.").
137. United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating the court did not
find the officer's actions to be reasonable because "the government has not presented any evi-
dence of police manuals or training materials, state case law, legislative history, or any other
state custom or practice that would create some objectively reasonable basis for the traffic
stop").
138. See United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 2005) (reviewing the code to
determine whether the officer's interpretation was reasonable).
139. Id.
140. See Logan, supra note 45, at 95-96.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Hinojosa v. State, 319 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Ark. 2009); State v. Horton, 246 P.3d
673, 675-76 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010).
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court held that the stop was unreasonable. 144 As illustrated above,
though the majority asserts that allowing mistakes of law damages the
separation of powers, there is no evidence that this is in fact occurring.
B. Allowing Mistakes of Law Comports with U.S. Supreme
Court Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the exclusionary rule
should be applied when an officer stops a vehicle based on a mistake
of law. However, allowing mistakes of law and limiting the exclusion-
ary rule fits within Supreme Court precedent. The majority view con-
flicts with United States v. Arvizu, which uses a totality-of-the-
circumstances test when judging reasonable suspicion and curtailing
the use of the exclusionary rule. Moreover, following Arvizu, the
Court further limited the use of the exclusionary rule in Davis v.
United States.
1. United States v. Arvizu
The majority view's approach regarding mistakes of law does not
comport with the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v.
Arvizu. 145 In Arvizu, the Court reviewed an officer's stop and subse-
quent seizure of drugs from a vehicle near the United States-Mexico
border.146 Although the driver did not break any traffic laws, the of-
ficer believed that the driver was smuggling drugs.' 47 The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the trial court and suppressed the evidence, reasoning
that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop.148 However,
the Supreme Court held that the search was reasonable. 149 The Court
reiterated that courts should apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test
from the standpoint of an objective officer when determining the rea-
sonableness of a search. 150 The Court further stated that the factors
should not be weighed separately, but rather should be taken together
as a "mosaic."' 15' In addition, the Court stated that lower courts
should not break reasonable suspicion into "a neat set of legal
144. United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 828 (8th Cir. 2006).
145. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002).
146. Id. at 268.
147. See id. at 269-71.
148. Id. at 272.
149. Id. at 277-78.
150. Id. at 273 ("[W]e have said repeatedly that [courts] must look at the 'totality of the cir-
cumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized and objective
basis' for a suspecting legal wrongdoing." (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1981))).
151. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 275-78.
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rules."'1 52 In fact, one of the primary purposes of Arvizu was to reject
the rules appellate courts created to review officer stops. 153
When comparing Arvizu and the majority view, inconsistencies
arise. The first is that a strict standard treating all mistakes of law as
unreasonable fails to follow the totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach. By considering only the category of the officer's mistake, the
court does not consider the "mosaic" and places undue weight on the
officer's error. Second, the majority view is a "neat set of legal rules,"
which the court warned against in Arvizu. 154 Indicating that mistakes
of law cannot be objectively reasonable turns the fluid reasonable sus-
picion standard into a bright line rule-a view the U.S. Supreme
Court rejects in similar contexts.155
2. Davis v. United States
After Arvizu, the Court decided Davis v. United States, 156 which ad-
dressed whether the fruits of a search could be used following the
Eleventh Circuit's incorrect interpretation of New York v. Belton.1
57
Two years before Arizona v. Gant, the officer in Davis relied on Bel-
ton and searched the defendant's entire car after a traffic stop.1 8 The
defendant was convicted because "the Eleventh Circuit had long read
Belton to establish a bright-line rule authorizing substantially contem-
poraneous vehicle searches incident to arrests of recent occupants.'
'1 59
However, while Davis was pending on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit,
the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant limited the scope of Belton,
which made the scope of search in Davis illegal.' 60
The Eleventh Circuit then upheld the defendant's conviction be-
cause, although the Supreme Court had limited Belton with the recent
Gant decision, "penalizing the officer" for relying on appellate prece-
dent would not deter future violations."' i61 The case was then ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court where the ruling was upheld.' 62 The
Court stated that "[e]vidence obtained during a search conducted in
reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not subject to the exclu-
152. Id. at 274 (internal quotations omitted).
153. Cf. Jennifer Pelic, Note, United States v. Arvizu: Investigatory Stops and the Fourth
Amendment, 93 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 1037 (2003).
154. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.
155. Id. at 275-78.
156. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
157. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
158. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2426.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (2010).
162. Davis, 131 S. Ct at 2429.
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sionary rule. ' 163 The Court reasoned that when an officer relies on a
judicial decision and that judicial decision is overruled, the officer,
though operating under a mistake, should not be penalized. 164 In ad-
dition, the Court took the opportunity to reiterate that "[e]xclusion
exacts a heavy toll on both the judicial system and society at large
[because] its bottom-line effect, in many cases, is to suppress the truth
and set the criminal loose in the community.1' 65 The Court concluded
by stating that exclusion was a "last resort" and that "the deterrence
benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs."'1 66
The Davis ruling was unsurprising in light of Arvizu and Gant.167
What Davis provided was a reinforcement of the sentiment expressed
in Herring: that the use of the exclusionary rule should be limited and
the benefits of deterrence must be weighed against societal costs. 168
Simple negligence by officers is insufficient to invoke the exclusionary
rule and, given the societal impact of excluding evidence of criminal
activity, courts should be careful with its application. 169 Through the
blanket use of the exclusionary rule, the majority view fails to reflect
the Supreme Court's restrained application of the rule, which balances
the rights of the accused against the benefits to society.
IV. IMPACT
Allowing officers to make reasonable mistakes of law and fact is
advantageous in two ways: (1) courts no longer need to distinguish
between mistakes of law and fact, and (2) societal interests are fully
protected. These advantages weaken the majority view and provide a
more workable solution.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2429-30.
165. Id. at 2428.
166. Id..
167. James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues, 9 OHIo
ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 392 (2011) ("This good faith exception for Fourth Amendment errors by
judges and faultless law enforcement conduct-i.e., officers lacking even negligence-was con-
sistent with precedent.").
168. See id. at 393 ("In sum, Davis delivered an unmistakable doctrinal message: the culpabil-
ity threshold announced in Herring was no passing fancy or trial balloon. It is a serious and
demanding prerequisite precluding suppression in the absence of a sufficiently blameworthy
Fourth Amendment violation by law enforcement.").
The basic insight of the Leon line of cases is that the deterrence benefits of exclusion
"var[y] with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct" at issue .... [W]hen the
police act with an objectively "reasonable good-faith belief" that their conduct is law-
ful, or when their conduct involves only simple, "isolated" negligence, the "deterrence
rationale loses much of its force," and exclusion cannot "pay its way."
See Bradley, supra note 123, at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28).
169. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428-29.
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A. Mistakes of Law and Fact Are Difficult to Differentiate
One flaw of the majority view is that it assumes mistakes of law and
mistakes of fact are easily differentiated, when in reality they are in-
terrelated. 70 By allowing both mistakes of law and mistakes of fact,
the underlying reasonableness of the officer's actions become easier to
evaluate. Because there are no clear rules to determine which type of
mistake the officer made, the seizure is not reviewed on the merits of
the stop and whether the officer acted reasonably.171 Instead, the
court rules on which mistake the officer made, which is not easy to
differentiate. 172 This difficulty in distinguishing the two errors leads to
inconsistent or incorrect outcomes. 173 The Tenth Circuit case United
States v. Pena-Montes and the Idaho Supreme Court case of State v.
Horton demonstrate this concern.174
In Pena-Montes, an officer stopped the vehicle because he did not
see a license plate.175 During the stop, the officer discovered permits
in the window, but was unable to discern what type they were because
of the window's tint, so he extended the stop to ensure the tags were
proper.1 76 Although the car had registration permits, the officer
thought he saw dealer plates that were restricted to demonstration
purposes, 177 and because it was past 9:00 PM, he believed the driver
was violating the statute governing the use of dealer plates. 178 In New
Mexico, dealers are given dealer plates for demonstration purposes.
On the other hand, temporary registration permits, which are similarly
issued to dealers, are also used by car purchasers until they acquire
permanent license plates.179 The officer's understanding of the dealer
plate statute was correct in that they were restricted to demonstration
purposes. However, the vehicle did not have dealer plates; rather, the
defendant had the appropriate registration permits.
170. Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Of-
fenses, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 1563, 1565 ("Courts, however, have neither consistently applied nor
fully developed these doctrines; confusion on the precise distinction between the two has
reigned." (footnotes omitted)).
171. Id. at 508 (noting that in Regina v. Morgan the House of Lords was "far from alone in
stumbling over the distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law.").
172. Id.
173. See United States v. Arias, 213 F. App'x 230, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that the
defendant did not violate the law, but incorrectly classifying the officer's mistake as one of fact
not law). Compare United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2009) (O'Brien, J.,
concurring), with State v. Horton, 246 P.3d 673 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010).
174. See Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048; Horton, 246 P.3d 673.
175. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1051, 1053.
179. Id. at 1063 (O'Brien, J., concurring).
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During the extended search, the officer discovered a handgun that
was in the car and learned that one of occupants was an illegal immi-
grant.180 The court held that the officer prolonged the stop based on a
mistake of law and excluded the evidence. a81 The court reasoned that
if the officer had known the law, once he saw that the vehicle had
proper registration permits, and not dealer plates, he should have
stopped his investigation and allowed the occupants to leave.' 82 The
court held that the suspicion about the incorrect use of dealer plates
would have been resolved and, therefore, there was no longer a rea-
sonable suspicion.
The concurring opinion, however, asserted that the mistake was not
one of law, but one of fact. 83 The concurrence reasoned that the of-
ficer correctly understood the law concerning dealer plates, but mis-
identified the type of plate the defendant was using. 84 As the officer
approached the vehicle he saw the permit but the tinting made the
plate hard to discern. 185 This misunderstanding of what type of plate
or permit the vehicle had constituted a mistake of fact and could have
extended the stop.186
Similarly, in State v. Horton, the officer mistook the proper use of a
special license plate. 187 The officer stopped the vehicle on suspicion
of improper license plates, but, in fact, the driver had repossession
plates and was not violating the law.' 88 During the stop, the officer
searched the vehicle and seized drugs. 189 At trial, the officer testified
that "although he was aware that Idaho repossession plates existed, he
had never seen one and was unaware" of their designation. 190 The
trial court admitted the evidence after finding that the officer commit-
ted a reasonable mistake of fact. 191 The appellate court agreed, hold-
ing that the officer was not mistaken about the law, but about whether
the plate "was a designated repossession plate."'1 92 The appellate
180. See id. at 1051 (majority opinion).
181. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d at 1053-58.
182. Id. at 1057-58.
183. Id. at 1059 (O'Brien, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 1064.
185. Id. at 1061-63.
186. Id.
187. State v. Horton, 246 P.3d 673, 674-75 (Idaho Ct. App. 2010).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 674.
190. Id. at 676.
191. Id. at 677.
192. Id. at 676-77.
Here, the officer did not know that the lettering designation "RPO" was used for an
Idaho repossession plate. While the officer had heard of repossession dealer plates, he
had never seen one and was unable to distinguish or identify its designation. His mis-
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court reasoned that because the officer was unfamiliar with reposses-
sion plates and the controlling statute, the mistake was more akin to
one of fact instead of law.193
In both Horton and Pena-Montes, the officers misunderstood
whether the driver was using a valid license plate. However, each
court classified the mistake differently. Horton framed the case as
whether the officer thought the plate was a repossession plate, but
Pena-Montes relied on whether the officer correctly understood the
dealer tag regulations. In addition, the concurrence in Pena-Montes
believed the mistake was one of fact, not law. Both cases demonstrate
how mistakes of fact and law are intertwined.
Instead of applying the confusing fact-law distinction, courts should
use the objectively reasonable standard for all mistakes. The advan-
tage to this analysis is that all officer mistakes are judged by one stan-
dard: reasonableness. This will increase the predictably of outcomes
for all parties.
Importantly, the court is already familiar with the objectively rea-
sonable analysis because it uses it for mistakes of fact. Both parties
would be able to aid the court's analysis by introducing evidence and
testimony about whether the mistake was objectively reasonable.194
The court would then apply a familiar test and determine whether the
officer acted reasonably, thus avoiding the pitfalls of the mistake of
law-fact distinction.
B. The Majority View Fails to Protect Society's Interests
By bifurcating officer mistakes of law and fact, courts fail to con-
sider society's interest and create unnecessary ambiguity, making it
difficult for officers to do their job. This Comment has focused solely
on traffic stops because the jurisprudence on this topic is all traffic-
stop related. However, if the scenario moves beyond traffic stops,
does the majority view's reasoning still apply? For example, assume
that an officer is walking a beat in Chicago a day after McDonald v.
Chicago, which invalidated Chicago's handgun ordinance. 195 Assume
that the officer sees an individual carrying a handgun and stops him.
Upon searching that individual he finds drugs and later discovers that
take was not the law generally regarding a repossession agent plate or its legal exis-
tence, but whether, in fact, the plate on this vehicle was a designated repossession plate.
Id.
193. Horton, 296 P.3d at 676-77.
194. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 455 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2005).
195. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
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the gun was used in homicide. Using the majority analysis, the officer
made a mistake of law; the Chicago ordinance no longer applies and
the officer should have known. Per the majority, this mistake is un-
reasonable and the exclusionary rule must be applied. Here two
harms occur. First, the defendant walks and society as a whole suffers.
Second, the officer may question his actions next time he sees another
violation of the law.
First, the majority fails to recognize the need to balance society's
interest against the rights of the defendant. When officers make mis-
takes they are performing important police functions that benefit soci-
ety.196 In United States v. Leon, the Supreme Court stated that "when
law enforcement officers have acted in objective good faith or their
transgressions have been minor, the magnitude of the benefit con-
ferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the criminal
justice system."' 97 The need to balance society's interest is supported
in Illinois v. Krull, Herring v. United States, and Davis v. United
States.1 98 In an effort to protect both society and the individual, it is
optimal to allow a court to balance the rights of individuals and the
importance of law enforcement. This balancing only occurs when
courts allow mistakes of law to be objectively reasonable.
Secondly, the primary reasoning for allowing mistakes of fact is that
officers on the streets encounter numerous ambiguous situations
every day. Officers are forced to make split-second decisions on
whether to stop an individual that they perceive is about to commit a
crime. Courts recognize this by allowing officers to make reasonable
errors in good faith. If the court did not allow officers to make these
reasonable mistakes, it would force them to second guess both their
training and instincts.199
The same reasoning should apply to mistakes of law. The same con-
cerns about split-second decision making and the importance of police
functions apply to mistakes of fact apply to mistakes of law. When
officers see a possible violation, they should stop the individuals to
196. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011); see also People v. Glick, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (discussing the balancing of the Fourth Amendment rights of
individuals with the important governmental interest in keeping unsafe and stolen vehicles off
the road).
197. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984).
198. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) ("[T]he benefits of deterrence must
outweigh the costs. . . . '[To the extent that application of the exclusionary rule could provide
some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed against [its] substantial social
costs."' (alteration in original)).
199. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1048-50 (1983); State v. Miglavs, 63 P.3d 1202,
1210 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).
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clear up any confusion instead of having to think about what type of
mistake they are making. By treating all mistakes the same, officers
no longer need to worry about the type of mistake, but only whether
the mistake is reasonable. Officers can continue to perform important
police functions without second guessing their actions.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the minority approach and allow officers to
make reasonable mistakes of law. By allowing -reasonable mistakes of
law courts will be using one standard, rather than relying on the subtle
difference between mistakes of law and fact. Also, an officer will be
able to do his job without worrying about whether his mistake will be
fatal.
Allowing officers to make objectively reasonable mistakes of law
will protect constitutional rights while enhancing overall protection
for society. The majority view's primary argument is that allowing
mistakes of law will discourage officers from learning the law and cre-
ate opportunities for abuse. The minority's view, however, offers the
same protections as the majority view. When an officer makes a mis-
take of law, the court reviews the officer's conduct and excludes evi-
dence if the mistake was unreasonable. This balancing already occurs
under the mistake of fact analysis and has proven successful in the
Eighth Circuit. This judicial review will provide the protections the
majority desires.
Additionally, the minority view provides the added benefit of both
societal and officer protection. First, by allowing objectively reasona-
ble mistakes of law, officers can continue to provide important polic-
ing functions that protect society as a whole. Instead of the automatic
exclusion, the court is able to review the officer's actions and make a
determination on whether they were reasonable and if the fruits of the
search should be admitted. Secondly, officers are protected by al-
lowing mistakes of law. Similar to mistakes of fact, officer's encounter
ambiguous situations on a daily basis that require split-second deci-
sion making. By allowing objectively reasonable mistakes of law, the
court enables the officer to make decisions without having to second
guess their actions.
Daniel N. Haas*
* Thanks to Professor Linus Chan for his assistance with the article. This is for Ren6e and
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